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Abstract
This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of ￿rms￿precautionary investment
behavior in response to the anticipation of future ￿nancing constraints. Firms increase their
demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints
and decrease the probability of having to forego future pro￿table investment opportunities.
This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary
increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show
in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of
shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run
propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the
aggregate and ￿rm-level composition of investment.
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11 Introduction
Firms typically face a choice between multiple projects when deciding how to invest and ￿nanc-
ing constraints may impact this decision in two ways. If there are ￿nancing shortages in the
present the ￿rm will tend to, all else equal, favor projects that attract more external ￿nance
than others. If ￿rms instead anticipate future ￿nancing constraints, and to the extent that
these are costly, they may prefer projects that produce earlier or safer returns that do not com-
promise the future strength of their balance sheet. Indeed, ￿rm managers typically cite as one
of their main concerns the availability of future resources to avoid ￿nancial distress and to be
able to bene￿t from pro￿table investment opportunities, and empirical evidence suggests that
￿rms￿precautionary behavior in anticipation of future expected ￿nancial constraints is a key
determinant of their investment and operating decisions.1
The concern for whether ￿nancing constraints signi￿cantly a⁄ect the type of investment
￿rms carry out is supported by empirical evidence on the compositional dynamics of investment.
Aghion, et al. (2007) ￿nd using a ￿rm-level data-set that while the share of R&D investment
over total investment is countercyclical for ￿rms that do not face credit constraints, it becomes
pro-cyclical for credit constrained ￿rms. At the aggregate level, Aghion, et al. (2010) provide
evidence using data on the composition of investment of a panel of countries that the share
of structural (long-term) investment over total investment decreases following shocks that can
be expected to make ￿rms more likely to be credit constrained in the near future, and also
document that this e⁄ect is stronger for less ￿nancially developed economies.
In this paper we perform a quantitative theoretical exploration of the implications for ag-
gregate investment and output dynamics of the joint consideration of investment choice and
￿nancing constraints in an intertemporal setup which allows for a precautionary investment
behavior of ￿rms that anticipate future ￿nancial constraints. Does the combination of invest-
ment choice and ￿nancing constraints in ￿rms act to dampen or amplify the e⁄ects of aggregate
shocks? Do ￿nancial frictions impact how much aggregate investment occurs in relatively more
productive long-term projects in such a way that shocks are propagated through time? And
￿nally, can a model with these ingredients account for the behavior of the composition of in-
vestment across the business cycle? These questions are dealt with by analyzing a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model of a production economy subject to aggregate and idio-
syncratic uncertainty. In the model, risk-neutral entrepreneurs produce capital to be used by
consumption good producing ￿rms. Entrepreneurs have access every period to a safe but low-
return short-term technology that produces capital goods, and also to a highly pro￿table risky
technology that performs research and development (R&D) and produces positive long-term
spillovers on other entrepreneurs￿capital-producing technology. They may su⁄er from credit
constraints when seeking external ￿nance; investment in R&D does not generate collateral and
cannot attract external ￿nance, while the safe investment generates a positive and endogenous
1Surveys by Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) ￿nd that CFOs consider ￿nancial
￿ exibility (having enough internal funds to avoid having to fore-go positive Net Present Value projects in the
future) to be the primary determinant of their policy decisions. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) report
that the expectation of future ￿nancing problems signi￿cantly a⁄ects ￿rms￿investment policies, and Caggese and
Cunat (2007) ￿nd that it signi￿cantly impacts hiring decisions.
2amount of pledgeable output.
Entrepreneurs have an incentive to shift investment towards the risky project in recessions
because its returns are relatively acyclical whereas short term activities o⁄er poor returns in
downturns. However, given that they can only pledge the returns of their short-run safe in-
vestments as collateral this means that in recessions they produce less pledgeable output and
can borrow less per unit of investment, resulting in countercyclical credit constraints. This
explanation for the countercyclicality of ￿nancing constraints is the ￿rst result of the paper
and provides an alternative to the two main explanations o⁄ered in the literature that ascribe
the countercyclicality of ￿nancing problems to countercyclical agency costs2 or to collateral
constraints and lack of indexation of debt contracts3.
The second and main contribution of the paper is the description and quantitative evaluation
of a novel ampli￿cation and propagation mechanism of shocks based on the precautionary
investment behavior of ￿rms. If a negative aggregate productivity shock hits the economy,
entrepreneurs anticipate its e⁄ects to persist and the probability of facing credit constraints in
future periods to increase. Despite risk-neutral preferences, the combination of credit constraints
and decreasing returns to scale production functions generates an e⁄ective risk aversion that
reduces the willingness of entrepreneurs to shift investment towards R&D as this may aggravate
future ￿nancing problems. This means that, relative to the unconstrained scenario in which
investment in the safe capital-production technology drops strongly, safe investment does not
fall as much, acting to dampen the contemporaneous e⁄ect of the shock; the short-run supply
of capital from entrepreneurs does not decrease as much as it does in the unconstrained case.
In other words, intertemporal optimization in the presence of ￿nance constraints increases the
incentive to invest more in activities that produce output sooner, thus cushioning the e⁄ect of
any shock on impact. In the benchmark calibration the contemporaneous reaction of output
is around 30% smaller than the one obtained in a version of the model with no ￿nancing
constraints. The simultaneous decrease in investment in the highly productive risky R&D
technology has negative long-term consequences, however, as it translates into less spillover
e⁄ects into other entrepreneurs and a decrease in average productivity in the medium and long-
run. This second mechanism adds propagation to the e⁄ects of shocks. In summary, a trade-
o⁄ arises between contemporaneous ampli￿cation and long-term propagation of the e⁄ects of
shocks; stronger dampening is associated to larger propagation. We show in the calibrated
model that these dampening and propagation e⁄ects of entrepreneurs￿precautionary behavior
are quantitatively signi￿cant.
At the heart of the quantitative relevance of the proposed mechanism is the idea that despite
the fact that a small fraction of agents are observed to be ￿nancially constrained at any given
point in time, a much larger fraction may anticipate the possibility of being constrained in
the future. The importance of this distinction between the e⁄ect of the anticipation of future
binding constraints and the contemporaneous e⁄ect of currently binding constraints was pointed
out long ago in the literature on consumption in the presence of borrowing constraints.4
The third main result is that this model is able to characterize how ￿nancing constraints
2As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), or Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2008).
3As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Iacoviello (2005).
4See Zeldes (1989).
3impact the business cycle pattern of the composition of investment. Binding ￿nancing con-
straints make the share of less collateralizable projects procyclical, irrespective of risk, while
the anticipation of future constraints makes the share of risky projects procyclical, irrespective
of the ability to collateralize such projects. To the extent that risk and pledgeability are not
perfectly related in many investment projects this introduces a way to empirically distinguish
between the relative importance of contemporaneously binding credit constraints and future
expected constraints.
Relationship with the Literature
A large body of research has studied the role of ￿rms￿￿nancing frictions in amplifying
business cycles. Most of this work focuses on how ￿rms￿investment capacity is a⁄ected by
tighter borrowing constraints in recessions or following a tightening of monetary policy, either
directly through a balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)) or indirectly through a decreased supply of
intermediated ￿nance (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Van den Heuvel (2007)). Common to most
of these models is the assumption that ￿rms can invest in only one type of project, and this has
two undesirable consequences for our purposes in this paper. First, by construction, questions
regarding composition of investment cannot be addressed. Second, because of the assumption
in most of these models of permanently binding credit constraints, the e⁄ect of the anticipation
of future constraints is limited to general equilibrium e⁄ects that a⁄ect entrepreneurs through
asset prices. But entrepreneurs who anticipate future constraints and have an incentive to insure
against them are unable to do so because their possible actions are limited to investing as much
as their (permanently binding) constraints allow in their single investment opportunity.
Two closely related papers are Matsuyama (2007) and Aghion et al. (2010), who both
address the composition of investment in models with ￿nancial constraints. Matsuyama (2007)
studies how ￿nancing constraints a⁄ect the allocation of credit to di⁄erent sectors, but only
considers the e⁄ect of currently binding constraints and not how the expectation of future
constraints may impact investment patterns today. Aghion et al. (2010) study the e⁄ect of
￿nancial frictions on the dynamics of short-run versus long-run investment across the business
cycle. Long term highly-productive investment projects are a source of liquidity risk which
means they may have to be discontinued mid-way should the ￿rm run into ￿nancing constraints,
so ￿nancial frictions discourage investment in long-term projects (lower mean growth) and tend
to make them procyclical (higher volatility). A number of considerations distinguish their work
from this paper. First, they ignore the e⁄ects of risk which are central to the mechanism
described in this paper. Second, the implication in their model of a larger share of long-term
investment is a contemporaneous increase in productivity, while the implication in our paper of
a larger share of risky illiquid investment is a delayed and protracted increase in productivity
and a contemporaneous drop in productivity due to a smaller share invested in safe short term
projects. Third, constraints are not allowed in their model to bind contemporaneously, as
opposed to mine. Finally, this paper is able to do a quantitative evaluation of the importance
of this mechanism by studying it in the context of a fully ￿ edged general equilibrium model.
This paper is also related to a strand of literature that studies the macroeconomic impact
of uninsurable investment risk (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Angeletos and Calvet (2006))
4in the neoclassical growth model, to analyze issues related to capital accumulation, equilibrium
real interest rates and output growth rates.
Finally, a number of theoretical papers in the corporate ￿nance literature have also identi￿ed
the possibility that ￿nance constraints in an intertemporal setting may generate risk aversion
in entrepreneurs with otherwise risk-neutral preferences. If ￿rms face costs of raising external
￿nance they may ￿nd it optimal to hedge against low cash-￿ ow realizations to avoid having to
fore-go positive NPV projects (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)) or to avoid non-linear costs
of ￿nancial distress (Stulz (1984)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies in detail the problem
faced by entrepreneurs in a partial equilibrium set-up. Section 3 embeds this analysis in a
fully general equilibrium dynamic stochastic model. The steady state of the model, and the
calibration, are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the main results of the model, and
section 6 evaluates the robustness of these results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Partial Equilibrium Model of Entrepreneurial Investment
In this section we develop and study a partial equilibrium model of entrepreneurial investment,
which will be embedded into a general equilibrium framework in section 3. We postpone the
detailed analysis of the complete economy setup to that section and here we just provide a brief
sketch for the bene￿t of clarity. We consider an in￿nite horizon discrete-time economy populated
by three types of agents: households, entrepreneurs and ￿rms. Entrepreneurs constitute the
capital-producing sector of the economy and may face ￿nancial constraints, and ￿rms form the
consumption-good producing sector and do not su⁄er from ￿nancing frictions.
Returning to the detailed analysis of entrepreneurs, these are modeled as overlapping gen-
erations of two-period lived agents, so that at any point in time two generations, which we will
label "young" and "old", coexist. Entrepreneurs only consume at the end of their old period
and are risk neutral.
2.1 Investment opportunities
An entrepreneur (young or old) alive in period t can invest simultaneously in two di⁄erent
technologies, a safe and a risky one. The safe one produces capital using consumption goods as
the sole input. This capital is then sold at price qt to households to be rented to consumption
good producing ￿rms who use it as a factor of production. Investing an amount is;t (s for "safe")
of consumption goods delivers an amount jtzeis;t+jtzsi￿
s;t of capital goods with certainty within
the same period, which after being sold generates revenues of qtjtzeis;t+qtjtzsi￿
s;t. The relevance
of having a production function with two additive terms will become clearer later on when we
introduce credit constraints; the ￿rst term will capture the pledgeable part of output that can
be borrowed against, and can be interpreted as a part of output that is delivered ￿rst and thus
provides early liquidity. The parameters ze and zs determine the productivity associated to the
early and regular parts of production respectively, and jt is a time-varying productivity factor
5that captures technological spillovers from other ￿rms and which will be discussed in more detail
in the following section dealing with general equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs can also invest in a risky technology that produces research and development
(R&D). Investing an amount ir;t (r for "risky") of consumption goods delivers an amount
(1 + "t+)zri￿
r;t units of the consumption good, where "t+ s U(￿￿;￿), with ￿ ￿ 1; captures
idiosyncratic uncertainty, which is resolved during the period and after decisions have been
made by the entrepreneur (and hence at a moment in time denoted t+). The exact process
that transforms consumption goods into R&D, and the market in which R&D is sold to obtain
revenues in terms of consumption goods, are left unmodeled as they are not the focus of this
paper.
The interpretation of the di⁄erences between both technologies could be broad and is meant
to capture primarily the dimensions of risk, pledgeability and maturity. The capital-producing
technology is safe, produces output in the short-term, and a fraction of the output it produces
can be pledged to outside ￿nanciers, while R&D is risky, has long-term spillover e⁄ects, and has
to be ￿nanced entirely by internal resources. Examples of the ￿rst could be purchasing new IT
equipment, expanding an existing production plant, or accumulating inventories, while examples
of the second could be research & development or advertising expenses. For the remainder of
the paper we will identify the safe technology as physical investment (machinery, plants and
equipment) and the risky technology as R&D and later on we will compare the behavior of
these variables to that of ￿xed capital formation and R&D in the data.
2.2 First-Best Solution
As discussed above, an entrepreneur born in period t will make a ￿rst investment choice at
the beginning of t and a second one, when old, at the beginning of period t + 1; and the
investment options are identical in both periods. Absent any borrowing constraints, young and
old entrepreneurs simply maximize expected pro￿ts ￿t each period, where the expectation is
taken only over the idiosyncratic risk term (1 + "t+), where Et (1 + "t+) = 1, and not over
aggregate uncertainty, as production takes place within the period once aggregate uncertainty





r;t ￿ bt; (1)
subject to the ￿rst period budget constraint
is;t + ir;t = nt + bt; (2)
where nt is entrepreneurs￿start-of-period wealth. For the young entrepreneurs, nt will arise
from wage payments, as they are assumed to be endowed when young with one unit of labor
which they provide to the ￿rms in exchange for a wage we
t. For the old entrepreneurs, nt will
be the net worth brought over from their young period. On the other hand, bt is the borrowing
entrepreneurs can undertake to ￿nance their investment. Entrepreneurs are assumed to be able
to borrow from households using intra-period debt contracts. The fact that borrowing and
6repayment occur within the period means that the interest rate charged on debt will be zero, as
households have no alternative use for those funds during such a short period of time. Negative
values of bt re￿ ect storage of consumption goods at a zero rate of return. In this unconstrained
scenario bt is allowed to be state-contingent; bt thus re￿ ects the expected repayments from the
entrepreneur to households.
Entrepreneurs, young and old, will simply invest up to the optimal unconstrained scale in
both their young and old ages. Modigliani-Miller conditions apply and balance sheet conditions
(in particular, the level of entrepreneurial net worth) are irrelevant for real outcomes. In period































One of the objectives of this paper is to study the cyclical behavior of the composition
of entrepreneurial investment, which is given by the ratio in expression (3). The two variables
which a⁄ect this ratio are qt and jt: To the extent that qt, the price of capital, varies procyclically,
this will make the ratio countercyclical. In other words, in a world without credit constraints
the share of R&D over total investment increases in downturns. In good times, the safe return
is high (qt+1 is high) and its relative pro￿tability with respect to the risky expected return
increases, given that the expected return to R&D remains constant and is not a⁄ected by the
business cycle. This feature of the risky technology is meant to capture the idea that R&D is
a long-term investment that will provide a signi￿cant share of its returns far into the future
and is thus not a⁄ected by current business conditions. This will be called the opportunity cost
e⁄ect, and follows the Schumpeterian view of recessions as "cleansing periods". The behavior
of jt, and its impact on this ratio, will be analyzed later.
2.3 Credit constraints and Precautionary Behavior
The amount entrepreneurs can borrow will be limited by the amount of end-of-period wealth
they can pledge to beginning-of-period lenders. We assume that they can only credibly pledge
to repay an amount of debt smaller than or equal to the early part of the output arising from
the safe capital-producing technology, so that
bt ￿ qtjtzeis;t:
There are at least two possible justi￿cations for this particular form of constraint. The ￿rst
one relies on two agency problems; households￿lack of ability to verify entrepreneurs￿returns and
7to enforce entrepreneurs￿debt obligations. The inability to verify returns renders risky returns
non-pledgeable by allowing entrepreneurs to lie to households about their risky returns and
claim they have had none (zero risky returns are always a possibility given that ￿ ￿ 1). Limited
contract enforceability may limit how much entrepreneurs can pledge of the safe returns. The
assumption made is either that early returns are harder to divert, or that there is no incentive to
divert them given that it would mean production has to be discontinued. Once the entrepreneur
holds the total returns from the safe activity, he could choose to default on any debt obligations.
For this reason, borrowing is limited to the early revenues the entrepreneur can obtain and can
repay the lender prior to completing his production. Following this interpretation, parameter
ze captures the degree of pledgeability of the safe returns.
A second rationalization sees the early returns as liquidity which can be reinvested in the
￿rm, which is isomorphic to being able to borrow that same amount at a zero interest rate.
As opposed to the unconstrained case, choices entrepreneurs make when young will a⁄ect
their investment choices when old because of credit constraints. A young entrepreneur in period






s;t+1 + qt+1zeis;t+1 + (1 + "(t+1)+)zri￿
r;t+1 ￿ bt+1; (5)
subject to budget constraints for their young and old age, respectively:
is;t + ir;t = nt + bt; (6)
is;t+1 + ir;t+1 = qtzsi￿
s;t + qtzeis;t + (1 + "t+)zri￿
r;t ￿ bt + bt+1; (7)
and subject to a borrowing constraint for each of the two periods:
bt ￿ qtzeis;t; (8)
bt+1 ￿ qt+1zeis;t+1: (9)
Now the time t expectation of time t + 1 revenues is taken over both idiosyncratic and
aggregate uncertainty.
In any given period, ￿nancing constraints bind when the unconstrained optimal investment
level, net of the borrowing it can generate, cannot be covered by internal resources nt. The


















where the ￿rst two terms on the right hand side capture the unconstrained optimal invest-
ment level requirements, and the third term is the maximum borrowing possible under that
level of investment.
8An inspection of expression (10) gives us some insight into the model￿ s predictions about the
cyclicality of credit constraints. The speci￿cation of production opportunities introduced in this
model o⁄ers one new important reason why credit constraints may worsen during downturns.
As we discussed when analyzing the unconstrained case, an opportunity cost e⁄ect introduces
an incentive in recessions to shift production towards the less pledgeable risky technology. This
means that, for a given level of investment, the shift in the mix of types of investments is such
that entrepreneurs are generating less pledgeable output and thus being able to borrow less.
This is a novel theoretical justi￿cation for the countercyclicality of constraints.
On top of this, the collateral value of output, driven by qt, decreases and internal resources,
captured by nt, are also lower in recessions. All these three factors concur to generate counter-
cyclical credit constraints.
We will assume that young entrepreneurs are always credit constrained.5 This assumption
is justi￿ed by the idea that young entrepreneurs represent start-up ￿rms with limited access
to ￿nance. They may however become unconstrained by the second period if they obtain
su¢ ciently high returns on their investments. The net worth with which they will enter their









s;t + (1 ￿ ￿)zri￿
r;t:
They will be ￿nancially unconstrained as long as nt+1 ￿ n￿
t+1 and constrained otherwise.















If entrepreneurs end up being unconstrained in their old age, they will invest according to
the ￿rst best investment scale studied before. If, however, they end up being credit constrained,




s;t+1 + qt+1jt+1zeis;t+1 + zri￿
r;t+1 ￿ bt+1;
subject to a budget constraint and a binding borrowing constraint
is;t+1 + ir;t+1 = nt+1 + bt+1
bt+1 = qt+1jt+1zeis;t+1;
which simpli￿es to
5I check that this assumption is met endogenously in the neighborhood of the steady state of the economy in







(1 ￿ qt+1jt+1ze)is;t+1 + ir;t+1 = nt+1: (12)
















r;t+1 = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ qt+1jt+1ze)￿t+1]nt+1
where the superscript oc stands for "old constrained".
Bringing everything together, we can now write down the simpli￿ed two period optimization
problem that a young entrepreneur has to solve, when he faces a probability of still remaining
credit constrained when old given by (11) and under the assumption that he is credit constrained


















where the expectation is taken over aggregate uncertainty (which a⁄ects the entrepreneur
in his old age through uncertainty about qt+1 and jt+1). The ￿rst integral captures those states
in which the entrepreneur is unconstrained and will obtain a pro￿t ￿
fb
t+1(nt+1) associated to the
￿rst best investment scale. The second integral captures those states in which the entrepreneur is
credit constrained and only obtains pro￿ts ￿oc
t+1(nt+1), and f (nt+1) is the distribution function
of nt+1.
Given what we know about the investment pattern of the unconstrained entrepreneurs and


































s;t + (1 + ￿)zr[nt ￿ (1 ￿ qtjtze)is;t]￿; (15)
nmin
t+1 = qtjtzsi￿














￿t+1 = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ qt+1jt+1ze)￿t+1; (18)
and















Finally, the entrepreneur will be subject to his ￿rst period budget constraint:
is;t + ir;t = nt + qtjtzeis;t: (20)
The potential for binding constraints in some future states of nature introduces an important
non-linearity in the relationship between the net worth nt+1 entrepreneurs transfer into their
second period and returns from investment in that period. As can be seen in expression (13),
pro￿ts in period t+1 in states in which the entrepreneur is unconstrained are linear in beginning-
of-period wealth nt+1, while they are concave in nt+1 in those states in which credit constraints
bind. A number of implications follow from this. First, an entrepreneur that does not expect
any borrowing constraints in the future does not care about the risk associated to his ￿rst period
investment; he will simply maximize expected returns. Second, the potential for future credit
constraints introduces a motive for risk management and discourages risky investment by the
entrepreneur. We will call this the precautionary e⁄ect. Third, to the extent that the likelihood
of being credit constrained is higher in downturns, this production-related risk aversion increases
in downturns, acting as a force that deters investment in R&D in downturns. Whether R&D as a
share of total investment is procyclical or countercyclical will depend on the strength of the two
opposing forces, the opportunity cost e⁄ect discussed before that generates countercyclicality
and the precautionary e⁄ect just described that generates procyclicality.
It is worth noting that any motive for risk aversion in this model arises from production-
related factors and does not arise from entrepreneurs￿preferences, which are assumed to be risk-
neutral. This is especially interesting in light of recent evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs
may enjoy a higher tolerance for risk than other non-entrepreneurial agents.6
The analytical expression for the ￿rst order condition that determines the optimal mix of
is;t and ir;t is detailed in the appendix. To provide a good understanding of the optimal choices
implied by the constrained optimization in (13) Figure 1 provides some comparative statics
of the sensitivity of the optimal ratio of risky to safe investment to variations in the degree
of idiosyncratic risk ￿ and the future price of capital qt+1. In the left panel we can observe
6See Moskowitz and Vissing-Jłrgensen (2002) for empirical evidence and Polkovnichenko (2003) for a theo-
retical interpretation of the evidence along the lines expressed here.

















































Figure 1: The share of risky investment as a function of the price of capital in period t + 1,
qt+1, and the level of idiosyncratic risk ￿:
that an increase in qt+1 encourages more investment in the risky technology by decreasing the
severity of future ￿nancing constraints. On the other hand, in the right panel we observe that
an increase in idiosyncratic risk induces entrepreneurs to shift out of the risky project and into
the safe alternative.
3 General Equilibrium
In this section we embed the entrepreneurial sector in a general equilibrium framework. Figure
2 contains an explanatory chart to aid in understanding the economic relationships between
the di⁄erent agents. Consider an in￿nite horizon discrete-time economy populated by three
types of agents: households (measure 1), entrepreneurs (measure ￿) and ￿rms (measure 1),
and where within each type there is a continuum of agents. There are two types of goods:
consumption goods and capital. Entrepreneurs produce capital using consumption goods and
are subject to agency problems when seeking external ￿nance. They ￿nance their investment
using their own net worth and external funds from households. Firms produce the consumption
good using labor (from households and entrepreneurs) and capital, and are not subject to any
agency problems. In order to better understand the sequence of events in this economy Table
1 summarizes what happens within each period.
We turn now to analyze households￿and ￿rms￿decision problems, and to aggregate entre-
preneurs￿investment decisions to specify the behavior of the entrepreneurial sector.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of risk-averse households who maximize expected lifetime utility of con-





subject to a budget constraint given by












Figure 2: The economy - agents and their economic relationships
taking as given wages wt, the price of capital qt, and the equilibrium rate of return on capital




where uc(t) and uc(t) are respectively the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal









All savings are invested in capital, and the total stock of capital is then rented by consumers
to ￿rms who use it for production the following period and pay in return an interest rate of
rt+1. Households also provide intra-period ￿nance to entrepreneurs at a zero interest rate.
3.2 Firms
Firms produce the consumption good using a constant returns to scale production function:
Yt = ￿tF(Kt;Lt;Le
t) (25)
where Kt is capital, Lt is labor supplied by households, Le
t = Le is labor supplied by entrepre-
neurial agents, which is constant, and ￿t is the total factor productivity. Aggregate quantities
are denoted in capital letters. The only source of dynamics in the model is ￿t which is subject
to exogenous shocks, as will be detailed later when we discuss calibration.
13Sequence Events
1 The aggregate productivity shock, ￿t, is realized.
2 - Firms hire labor from households and entrepreneurs and rent capital from
households. These inputs are used to produce the consumption good, Yt =
￿tF(Kt;Lt;Le
t):
- Households make their consumption and savings choice. Savings are used to
purchase new capital from entrepreneurs.
- Entrepreneurs borrow from households, and decide how to allocate their invest-
ment into risky and safe projects.
3 Entrepreneurial production takes place. Loans are repaid to households.
4 Households purchase all of the investment goods (new capital) from entrepreneurs.
Old entrepreneurs consume and die.
Table 1: Sequence of events within one period
Perfect competition in the factor markets implies the following factor prices:
rt = ￿tF1(t) (26)
wt = ￿tF2(t) (27)
we
t = ￿tF3(t) (28)
3.3 Entrepreneurs
3.3.1 Entrepreneurial safe investment and capital production
Aggregation of entrepreneurs￿investment and capital production has to take into account the
di⁄erent investment patterns of the three sub-types of entrepreneurs; young, old unconstrained
and old constrained. Young entrepreneurs are all (ex-ante) identical and make the same invest-
ment choices. Old unconstrained entrepreneurs have di⁄erent levels of net worth but all invest
identically too, at the optimal investment scale. Old constrained entrepreneurs with di⁄erent
levels of net worth invest di⁄erently but aggregation is simpli￿ed by the fact that their optimal
choices of is;t and ir;t are linear in wealth.
The overlapping generations structure implies that half of the entrepreneurial population
(the old) invests under the knowledge that it will not be investing again in the future, and
hence has no concern for risk management given that in the context of this model the only
reason to care about risk is that it may decrease expected pro￿ts in future periods. To deal
with this unrealistic feature we will allow for the share of the old to be lower than one half
and calibrated according to empirical evidence (calibration will be discussed in Section 4) and
this will be determined by parameter ￿ ￿ 0:5 which will be a time invariant factor capturing
the share of the entrepreneurial population made up by the old generation. This adjustment
does not a⁄ect entrepreneurs￿optimal choices, as this can be interpreted at the microeconomic
level as a fraction (1￿2￿)=(1￿￿) of young agents dying (and foregoing all their wealth) before
reaching old age.
14Aggregate supply of new capital will be given by
































where the ￿rst, second and third terms in the right hand side capture the capital supply of
young, old constrained, and old unconstrained entrepreneurs, respectively.
3.3.2 Entrepreneurial risky investment and R&D spillovers
Entrepreneurs￿ R&D activity generates spillovers on other entrepreneurs￿ capital-producing
technologies. Aggregate R&D, denoted Rt; is




















Spillovers a⁄ect the productivity of the safe technology through a multiplicative factor such
that output (in terms of capital goods) of an entrepreneur that invests is;t is jtzsi￿
s;t + jtzeis;t;
where
log(jt) = ￿j log(jt￿1) + ht￿1 (31)
and
ht = ￿hht￿1 + ￿(Rt￿1 ￿ Rss): (32)
The assumption made is that there is a level of aggregate R&D (the steady state level
Rss) that needs to be maintained to keep the productivity of the capital-producing technology
constant at j = 1. Any variation above or below this level will a⁄ect jt.7 What is behind this
speci￿cation is the notion that there is a level of R&D necessary to deal with changes in the
economic environment (such as changes in agents￿preferences, exhaustion of certain natural
resources or the development of new technologies) and keep the level of capital production
constant. The formulation of spillovers according to the speci￿cation in (31) and (32) guarantees
that a temporary variation in Rt away from Rss is able to generate long-run e⁄ects which are
larger than the short-run e⁄ects, as is consistent with the empirical evidence which will be
discussed in more detail in the calibration section.
7Notice that R&D performed in period t will start having spillover e⁄ects in period t+2 when the entrepreneurs
who produced it are no longer alive.
153.4 Remaining Market Clearing Conditions
We deal now with the remaining aggregate equilibrium conditions. The market for household
labor clears by equating ￿rms￿demand for labor given by (27) and households￿supply given by
(23). The market for new capital clears by equating demand from households in (22) and (24)
and supply of new capital in (29).
4 Calibration
We calibrate the economy to reproduce basic features of the U.S economy on a quarterly basis. In
addition the calibration is designed so the results are comparable with the existing quantitative
studies on agency costs and business cycle ￿ uctuations, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
Concerning the calibration of preferences, the utility function for households is chosen to be






+ vl(1 ￿ lt);
with vl chosen so that households work one-third of their available time in the steady state.
The intertemporal preference rate is set at ￿ = 0:99, selected to deliver an average annual real
interest rate of 3 percent, and the risk aversion parameter ￿ is set at 2, although di⁄erent values
(between 1 and 4) are also tested for robustness.






with a capital share ￿ of 0:36, a household labor share (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿e) of 0:63, and an entrepre-
neurial labor share ￿e of 0:01. The share of entrepreneurial labor is positive to ensure that
young entrepreneurs have positive net worth with probability one, and small so that the model
dynamics closely resemble the standard RBC dynamics when the ￿nancial frictions in the model
are removed. The capital depreciation rate is set to ￿ = 0:025 to match the capital/output ratio.
The technology shock, ￿t; follows the process
log￿t = ￿log￿t￿1 + ￿%%t
where ￿% = 0:01, ￿ = 0:95, and %t ￿ N(0;1). So far, all of these values are in line with those
usually adopted in the business cycle literature (Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
The calibration of parameters concerning the entrepreneurial sector can be divided into
three categories: those that control entrepreneurs￿￿nancing constraints, those that a⁄ect their
investment opportunities, and those that determine the extent to which their R&D activity has
positive spillover e⁄ects on other ￿rms.
The model does not explicitly address whether external ￿nance for entrepreneurs takes the
form of debt or equity, although the ￿xed-repayment contract strongly resembles debt. We
will consider nt, the wealth of entrepreneurs, to be the combination of retained earnings and
16inside equity, and bt to be debt and the only source of external ￿nance, on the basis of the
following argument: in small and medium enterprises a much larger share of equity-holders can
be considered insiders, because (i) managers are more likely to own a larger share of the company,
(ii) the prevalence of sponsor backed equity will be larger, and (iii) any equity-holder is bound
to be closer to management than in a large publicly quoted ￿rm in which arms-length share
ownership is more prevalent. On top of this a large literature on R&D ￿nancing has documented
that R&D is primarily ￿nanced by retained earnings and equity rather than debt (Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994), Aghion, Bond, Klemm, and Marinescu (2004)), so our calibration of the
debt-to-assets ratio will re￿ ect this. The parameter a⁄ecting ￿nancing constraints, ze, is set
to target a mean debt to assets ratio of 15% based on Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), who
document a 6% average ratio for R&D-intensive ￿rms, and on the average debt to assets ratio
for Compustat publicly listed ￿rms, which is 25% according to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
The entrepreneurial technology parameters are calibrated as follows. The capital share ￿ is
set to 0:22 (with values between 0:20 and 0:25 also tested for robustness), re￿ ecting, on the one
hand, the observation in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) that the capital share in investment
good producing sectors is lower (0:28) than the one in consumption good production (0:35),
and, on the other hand, taking into account that is;t and ir;t represent variable capital and that
there may be some additional ￿xed factor of production (say each entrepreneur owns some real
estate that it may ￿ exibly employ for his entrepreneurial venture) which consumes part of the
income share considered to accrue to capital and which is not speci￿cally modeled.
The productivity factor for the safe and risky technologies, zs and zr, and the idiosyncratic
risk of the risky technology, ￿; are set to match a return to the safe technology of 3%, a Sharpe
ratio for the risky technology close to 2.5, and a share of R&D investment over GDP of 1.5%,
in the low end of the estimates for developed countries (OECD, 2007).
The share of entrepreneurs ￿ is set to match the documented size of the private (i.e. not listed
in a stock exchange) sector in the U.S. economy, which roughly accounts for half of employment
and investment. The share of the entrepreneurial population made up of old entrepreneurs,
￿, is set at ￿ = 0:011, a very low value that ensures that the unrealistic feature of old agents
that are certain to terminate their entrepreneurial operations after the current period does not
in￿ uence the dynamics.
Finally, the spillover parameters are calibrated to match the estimated long-run output
elasticity of intra-industry R&D documented in Bernstein and Nadiri (1989). They estimate
the reduction in variable and average costs arising from R&D spillovers at the short and long
runs for a range of industries and ￿nd an R&D spillover elasticity of average costs of 0.1%(0.15%)
in the short-run (long-run). To map these observations into our model, we calibrate ￿, ￿h, and
￿j such that a 1% increase in R&D spillovers (captured by aggregate R&D output) generates
on average a reduction in the one-quarter ahead average cost of 0.1%, and a reduction in the
10-quarter ahead average cost of 0.15%.
175 The Financial Accelerator and the Composition of Investment
In this section we report the qualitative and quantitative ￿ndings concerning aggregate invest-
ment and output dynamics. The model is simulated by calculating a second order approximation
of the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state and solving the resulting
system of di⁄erence equations. We study in section 5.1 the model￿ s implications for the behavior
of the composition of aggregate entrepreneurial investment over the business cycle. In section
5.2 we examine the role of this novel transmission mechanism in amplifying and propagating
aggregate productivity shocks.
5.1 The Composition of Investment across the Business Cycle
The cyclical dynamics of the composition of ￿rms￿investment are at the heart of the ampli￿-
cation mechanism we describe in this paper. To better understand the mechanisms underlying
these dynamics, we simulate and compare the dynamics of the model described so far in this
paper, which we will label the Precautionary model, with one in which there are no ￿nancial
frictions in the entrepreneurial sector, which we will label from now on the RBC version, and
which corresponds to the frictionless investment behavior of entrepreneurs described in sub-
section 2.2.8 The calibration of the RBC model and the Precautionary model is the same,
which results in di⁄erent steady state values for both economies. For this reason, we study the
dynamics as percent deviations from steady state values.
Figure 3 plots the impulse response functions of selected variables to a negative 1% shock
to the productivity of the consumption good producing ￿rms.9 In the RBC version, following
the shock, ￿rms￿demand for new capital produced by entrepreneurs falls, which results in a
fall in its price. This fall in the price of capital in￿ uences entrepreneurs￿investment choices:
investing in the capital-producing safe technology is now relatively less pro￿table compared
to investing in the risky technology, so there is a shift in the share of resources allocated by
entrepreneurs towards the risky activity (the opportunity cost e⁄ect). This shift is caused by a
decrease in investment in the safe technology only, as the level of investment in the risky activity
remains unchanged.10 The RBC version of the model thus delivers cyclical patterns that follow
a Schumpeterian view in which recessions are periods when ￿rms carry out structural changes
to correct for ine¢ ciencies in the organization or to redirect their strategy by innovating or
investing in new products or markets.
In the Precautionary model, however, the presence of ￿nancing constraints alters the dynam-
ics following the shock. As before, following the negative productivity shock and the decrease in
demand for new capital, the price of capital decreases and this introduces again an incentive for
8Calling it "RBC", for "Real Business Cycle", is a slight abuse of the term as there are two di⁄erences with
respect to the standard RBC framework. On the one hand, in the standard framework capital is produced using
consumption goods by means of a one-to-one technology while in my version there is a capital producing sector
with decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, part of the wage bill of ￿rms reverts to entrepreneurs, which
is not the case either in the standard framework.
9The shock does not a⁄ect the productivity of the entrepreneurs￿safe capital-producing technology or of their
risky R&D technology.
10The level of investment in the risky activity remains unchanged in the RBC version because both its return
and the opportunity cost of capital invested in R&D (which in the unconstrained model is storage) remain
constant and are not a⁄ected by the business cycle.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a 1% negative shock to aggregate productivity of the
consumption-good producing ￿rms in both the RBC and Precautionary models. The responses are
percentage deviations of a variable from its steady-state value.
entrepreneurs to shift production away from the safe capital-producing technology towards risky
R&D. This, however, increases the severity of credit constraints, for three reasons. First, there is
now an incentive to produce more using the less pledgeable technology. Entrepreneurs can only
borrow against part of the returns of the safe capital-producing technology, but R&D has to be
funded entirely by internal resources. Secondly, the value of collateral (capital), which is driven
by qt, decreases. And ￿nally wealth available to newborn entrepreneurs, nt, is lower because
the wages they are paid by ￿rms decrease. Young ￿rms anticipate that given the persistence of
the productivity shock this means that the probability of facing ￿nancing constraints in their
second period has increased. This indeed the case, as is shown in the central panel of Figure 3
where the share of credit constrained old entrepreneurs increases sharply in the second quarter
following the shock, and stays high for 4 or 5 quarters. This calls for a decrease in investment
in the risky R&D technology to alleviate future ￿nancing problems. In sum, the introduction
of ￿nancing constraints means that the Schumpeterian drive to shift production towards R&D
in downturns is met with an opposing force that pushes towards a decrease in R&D investment
to alleviate the probability of facing future credit constraints. In the benchmark calibration
of Figure 3 the Schumpeterian e⁄ect dominates but the procyclicality of R&D is signi￿cantly
smaller than that of the RBC version, and, in fact, as the lower-right panel of Figure 3 shows,
is essentially acyclical.
The negative impact of the decrease in R&D investment reaches its maximum in the medium
to long-run, at around 15 quarters following the initial shock. As a result of this e⁄ect, the
productivity of the capital-producing technology decreases sharply, which itself has several im-
plications. First, the supply of new capital contracts, showing up as an increase in the price of
19Data RBC Precautionary
Share R&D over GDP 1.5%-3% 40.3% 1.4%
corr (R&D growth,GDP growth) 0.100 - 0.490 (1) 0.000 0.993
corr (share R&D,GDP) -0.004 (2) -0.171 -0.164
corr (R&D,Safe Investment) 0.214 (2) 0.000 0.959
Table 2: Cyclical Behavior of the Composition of Entrepreneurial Investment - (1) Obtained
from Walde and Woitek (2004). (2) Obtained from Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette and
Eymard (2008).
capital. On the other hand, the share of credit constrained entrepreneurs falls below the steady
state value; this is mostly due to the fact that investment opportunities for entrepreneurs are
not so attractive which means that the investment requirements associated to the optimal scale
are lower.
Table 2 displays some second moments of the simulated data and compares them to those in
the empirical literature. The safe investment is identi￿ed with ￿xed capital formation, and the
risky investment with research and development expenditures. Evidence on the cyclical pattern
of aggregate R&D investment is contained in Barlevy (2007) who uses aggregate and ￿rm-level
data to con￿rm that R&D growth rates correlate positively with GDP growth rates in the US,
as had been found in numerous previous studies. The simulated series in the RBC model yields
no correlation as the level of R&D investment is constant. The Precautionary model yields a
near perfect positive correlation; this is due to the fact that credit constrained ￿rms will have
more wealth and better access to ￿nance and invest more in every item, so levels of all types of
investment are expected to be positively and highly correlated with GDP.
Empirical evidence on the cyclical behavior of the aggregate composition of investment
is harder to ￿nd, and to the best of my knowledge there is no study of how the ratio of
R&D to total investment (physical investment plus R&D) ￿ uctuates around the business cycle.
The closest empirical counterpart can be found in ￿rm-level studies that relate R&D-to-total-
investment ratios to GDP or sales, and the patterns found for these ￿rms may provide a useful
and relatively accurate insight into the behavior of the aggregate composition of investment to
the extent that the sample is large enough and representative of the R&D producing population
of ￿rms. One such study is Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette and Eymard (2007), who use
a large sample of French ￿rms to study the behavior of the ratio of R&D-to-total investment.
They ￿nd that such ratio is acyclical on average, and turns procyclical for the most credit
constrained ￿rms. In the RBC version, that ratio is countercyclical, with a correlation between
the ratio of R&D to total investment and GDP growth of -0.171, whereas that same correlation is
slightly lower in the Precautionary model. Finally, the relationship between physical investment
and R&D investment is positive in their sample, and so it is in the simulated data using the
Precautionary model. The RBC version again delivers a zero correlation given that R&D
investment is constant.
Putting everything together, the Precautionary model is able to deliver both a positive cor-
relation between output growth and R&D growth and a negative but small correlation between






RBC 1.30% 0.95% 0.98% 0.75 0.99 0.75
Precautionary 1.29% 0.91% 1.44% 1.12 0.99 1.11
Data 1.36% 0.94 4.87 5.39 - -
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) - - - - 1.47 -
Table 3: Summary of Numerical Results - Comparison of Outcomes (Real U.S. data for 1985-
2005 from Bachmann, et al (2008)). Simulated data is HP ￿ltered (lambda=1,600)
output growth and the ratio of risky-to-total investment, as in the data, a combination of re-
sults which the RBC model is unable to produce. This result is despite the fact that we are
comparing real data, subject to multiple demand and supply shocks, with simulated data whose
only source of dynamics is a technology shock, which greatly simpli￿es the dynamics of business
cycles and may exaggerate correlations.
5.2 Ampli￿cation and Propagation of Productivity Shocks
We now turn to study how the mechanism described in this paper a⁄ects the reaction of aggre-
gate investment and output to technology shocks, both contemporaneously (ampli￿cation vs.
dampening) and through time (propagation). We will again be comparing the frictionless RBC
version of the model with the full Precautionary version.
Inspecting Figure 3 we can see that the RBC version of the model produces a reaction
of output and investment that closely tracks the evolution of the technology shock, as is well
known. In essence, there is little ampli￿cation or propagation in this version. In the Precau-
tionary version, however, the contemporaneous reaction of output is around 30% smaller than
in the RBC model, so there is dampening in the short run, but the long term propagation of
the shock is larger. The intuition for this result is that, following the impact of the negative
technology shock, young entrepreneurs, anticipating the higher probability of facing ￿nancing
constraints in the following period, are reluctant to implement a large shift towards the R&D
technology, as the volatility of its cash ￿ ows increases the probability of future ￿nancing prob-
lems. This means that, relative to the unconstrained RBC case, entrepreneurs do not decrease
their investment in the safe capital-producing technology as much and the supply of new capi-
tal does not contract signi￿cantly. This results in a smaller decrease in the aggregate stock of
capital in the Precautionary model, and a smaller contemporaneous ampli￿cation of the shock.
The other implication of this behavior is that investment in R&D falls more in the Precau-
tionary model. The aggregate e⁄ects of this occur further in the future through the technological
spillovers that aggregate R&D produces on entrepreneurs￿capital-producing technology, which,
as Figure 3 shows, accumulate through time and are very persistent. In the benchmark calibra-
tion, spillover e⁄ects are large enough to cancel the dampening e⁄ect around 25 quarters after
the impact of the shock, and subsequently are large enough to generate higher propagation than
in the RBC version. In summary, the combination of ￿nancing frictions and investment choice
introduces a trade-o⁄ between short-run ampli￿cation and long-run propagation. The stronger
21the contemporaneous dampening of shocks, the larger the intertemporal propagation.
It is worth mentioning at this point that the way ￿nancing frictions are introduced in this
model is such that their ability to alter dynamics is limited. This is so because by assumption
only entrepreneurs face credit constraints, and their role in this economy is to produce capital
to be used by consumption good producing ￿rms. The stock of capital depreciates slowly (at
a rate of around 2,5% quarterly), so if ￿nancing frictions only a⁄ect the supply of new capital
that replaces the depreciated one their impact on dynamics cannot be too large. If ￿nancing
frictions had been modeled such that they a⁄ected the production of total output e⁄ects could
possibly be much larger.11
Table 3 presents some second moments of the RBC and Precautionary models and compares
them to the empirical data. Despite the contemporaneous dampening e⁄ect of entrepreneurs￿
precautionary behavior, intertemporal propagation acts to increase the volatility of output to
the point that the standard deviation of output in the Precautionary model is lower but close
to that of the RBC model, and the same happens for households￿consumption. Intertemporal
spillovers e⁄ects end up making households￿investment more volatile in the Precautionary model
despite the fact that on impact the shock a⁄ects investment less in that model.
A benchmark against which to compare our results is the study of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004),
who question the quantitative signi￿cance of collateral constraints to signi￿cantly amplify the
e⁄ects of technology shocks on aggregate investment. They obtain a degree of ampli￿cation,
measured as the standard deviation of output relative to the standard deviation of the total
factor productivity process, of 1.47, above the 0.99 obtained for both the Precautionary and
RBC versions. Our result thus lends more support to the notion that collateral constraints
may not be able to generate a signi￿cant ampli￿cation of productivity shocks. Indeed, as this
analysis suggests, they may signi￿cantly dampen their short-run e⁄ects.
6 Robustness of the Results on Ampli￿cation and Propagation
In this section we explore the sensitivity of results to variations in the parameter values used in
the baseline calibration. In particular, the e⁄ects of changes in the capital share, the degree of
R&D spillovers, and the amount of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic risk will be studied.
6.1 Idiosyncratic Risk
The volatility of the returns to the risky entrepreneurial activity, which is entirely idiosyncratic,
is a key element of the precautionary behavior of young entrepreneurs who anticipate the pos-
sibility of being credit constrained when old. As a result, varying the degree of entrepreneurial
risk has important consequences. We simulate the response to a negative 1% aggregate pro-
ductivity shock for two parameterizations of this risk. A low degree of risk, corresponding to
￿ = 0:5 and a Sharpe ratio of 9.5 and a high one corresponding to ￿ = 0:62 and a Sharpe ratio
of 1.
11For a detailed analysis of the di⁄erence between modeling ￿nancing constraints in the capital producing
sector or in the consumption good sector see Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998).
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a 1% negative shock to aggregate productivity of the
consumption-good producing ￿rms for di⁄erent degrees of idiosyncratic risk. The responses are per-
centage deviations of a variable from its steady-state value.
In the benchmark calibration the net e⁄ect of the two opposing forces that determine whether
the share of risky investment is procyclical or countercyclical is such that the Schumpeterian
rate-of-return e⁄ect dominates and the ratio is procyclical. If we increase idiosyncratic risk
slightly to ￿ = 0:62 from the benchmark value of ￿ = 0:60 the e⁄ect is quite dramatic and such
that the net e⁄ect is close to acyclicality. Further increases in the calibration of idiosyncratic
risk bring the Sharpe ratio close to zero, which is empirically not realistic.
The amount of new capital produced and sold to consumers falls more with higher risk,
however, despite the fact that young entrepreneurs do not cut their supply as much. The
reason for this lies in the fact that demand for new capital falls more (consumption falls less),
and the cut in capital supply come mostly from the old generation, for which the rate-of-return
e⁄ect is strongest.
6.2 Capital Share
As was mentioned above, the way ￿nancial frictions are introduced in this economy a⁄ects their
potential to in￿ uence aggregate dynamics. Given that they only a⁄ect the production of capital
goods and that the stock of capital depreciates slowly, this limits their e⁄ect. On top of this, the
share of capital as a factor of production is around one third, which further limits the e⁄ects. So
it seems reasonable to suspect that the strength of the e⁄ects may depend on two parameters;
￿, the rate of depreciation of capital, and ￿; the capital share in production of consumption
goods. While estimates for ￿ do not vary much and stand at around 2,5% quarterly, estimates
for ￿ vary from around 0.20 to 0.40 from country to country according to recent evidence in
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a 1% negative shock to aggregate productivity of the
consumption-good producing ￿rms for di⁄erent capital shares. The responses are percentage deviations
of a variable from its steady-state value.
Gollin (2002).12 Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to a negative 1% productivity shock for
the Precautionary model calibrated at two values of the capital share, ￿ = 0:33 and ￿ = 0:40.
Ampli￿cation in the model is greater for larger values of the capital share, and the reaction
of many variables resembles that of the RBC model version. The intuition for this result lies
in the fact that by increasing the capital share and maintaining the size of the entrepreneurial
population and of its production opportunities, this exercise alleviates ￿nancing constraints and
decreases sharply the share of old constrained entrepreneurs. Financing constraints are less of
a concern with higher capital shares, and that is re￿ ecting in weaker precautionary mechanism
that delivers less dampening.
6.3 Degree of Spillovers
The medium and long-run e⁄ects of short-run changes in the composition of investment are
channeled through the R&D spillovers. Figure 6 plots the impulse response of the degree of
spillovers, the composition of entrepreneurial investment, and output following a negative 1%
consumption-good production productivity shock for three levels of spillovers, starting at no
spillover e⁄ects at all (￿ = 0), up to spillovers (￿ = 30) that imply contemporaneous and long-
run elasticities of output to aggregate R&D investment of 0.26 and 0.40 respectively, on the
upper part of the empirical estimates.
Two e⁄ects of the degree of spillovers are notable. On the one hand, the long run e⁄ect
12Higher values for the capital share may be warranted as well for another reason: intangible capital is not
fully accounted for in national accounts and hence capital￿ s income share might be larger than 0.35. See Antunes
and Cavalcanti (2007).
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a 1% negative shock to aggregate productivity of the
consumption-good producing ￿rms for di⁄erent degrees of R&D spillovers. The responses are percentage
deviations of a variable from its steady-state value.
of higher spillovers is as expected; larger spillovers deliver more intertemporal propagation of
shocks, and the di⁄erential e⁄ect of spillovers (or the gap between the output reaction with no
spillovers and the output reaction with spillovers) keeps growing even after 25 quarters following
the occurrence of the shock.
Perhaps less obvious are the short run e⁄ects. The contemporaneous reaction of the share
of risky investment is much less procyclical the higher the spillovers, and then increases after
around ￿ve quarters in such a way that after 10 quarters the degree of spillovers does not
signi￿cantly a⁄ect the composition of investment. One likely explanation is that households,
in anticipation of very negative spillovers that will make producing capital highly unproductive
(and hence cut the supply and increase its price), bring capital purchases forward and do not
decrease demand for capital much following a negative shock. After several periods, the negative
spillovers start making the safe investment less desirable to entrepreneurs relative to the risky
one and they shift production towards a higher share of risky investment.
257 Conclusion
This paper introduces a model in which risk-neutral entrepreneurs behave in a risk averse manner
and in which the source of risk aversion has to do with investment opportunities and ￿nancial
constraints. The model also provides a theoretical underpinning for the countercyclicality of
￿nancing constraints. We then use this framework to explore the implications of ￿rms￿risk-
averse behavior for the role of credit market imperfections in amplifying or dampening shocks
to the macroeconomy. A novel dampening mechanism of macroeconomic shocks is identi￿ed,
which is based on a time-varying likelihood of future ￿nancing constraints that a⁄ects ￿rms￿
preference for the risk pro￿le of their portfolio of investment projects. The dampening e⁄ect
is shown to be quantitatively large. On the other hand, this framework is able to account for
the empirically documented cyclical variation in the composition of real investment, a feature
which the existing models studying the macroeconomic implications of ￿nancial constraints
cannot account for.
A next step in this research agenda is to study if this mechanism can be potentially en-
hanced by ￿nancial intermediaries￿own credit constraints, creating a feedback mechanism be-
tween entrepreneurial investment choices, asset prices, and banks￿balance sheet conditions and
risk-sharing capacity. A main source of risk and liquidity management for ￿rms are ￿nancial
intermediaries, both using ex-ante protection through credit lines, and ex-post protection by
borrowing on the spot market. The ability of ￿nancial intermediaries and capital markets to
satisfy ￿rms￿liquidity demand may itself be subject to similar countercyclical constraints as
non-￿nancial ￿rms, creating the potential for a two-way response between ￿rms￿investment
decisions and intermediaries￿liquidity supply. This feedback e⁄ect could be important and is
left for future research.
268 Appendix
8.1 Entrepreneurs￿Problem - First Order Conditions




















































































































￿t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ qtjtze)￿t: (37)
To obtain the optimal solution expression (33) needs to be solved for is;t. The amount of
risky investment, ir;t, can then be obtained from:
ir;t = we
t ￿ (1 ￿ qtjtze)is;t: (38)
8.2 Aggregate Equilibrium Conditions and Solution Method









































































log(jt) = ￿j log(jt￿1) + ht￿1; (44)
ht = ￿hht￿1 + ￿(Rt￿1 ￿ Rss); (45)
nmax
t+1 = qtjtzsi￿
s;t + (1 + ￿)zr[nt ￿ (1 ￿ qtjtze)is;t]￿; (46)
nmin
t+1 = qtjtzsi￿
































s;t = ￿tnt (51)
and
ioc
r;t = ￿tnt (52)
For the purposes of the dynamic analysis the household labor supply has been ￿xed at 0:3,
to focus attention at the mechanisms introduced in this paper. In the equilibrium conditions
described here Lt = L = 0:3.











r;t, Rt, jt, and ht from (33), (38) and (39)-(52) as a function of exogenous
state variable ￿t and endogenous state variables , Kt, nmax
t , nmin
t , jt￿1, and ht￿1, where the law
of motion for ￿t is given by:
log￿t = ￿log￿t￿1 + ￿%%t; (53)
and %t+1 ￿ N(0;1).
The model is simulated using Dynare by calculating a second order approximation of the
equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state and solving the resulting system
of di⁄erence equations.
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